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1. Objectives and relevance of the dissertation 
At the dawn of the 21st century the Hungarian public is disappointed and pessimistic 
about its future, despite the fact that the country as a member of the European Union and 
NATO has unquestionably become part of the Euro-Atlantic region.1 The operational role of 
the state that Hungarians consider so vital in shaping their lives is perceived as unsuccessful2, 
because in their opinion them, it does not contribute sufficiently to their welfare. Not only the 
mood of the population, but also international surveys indicate that in Hungary public 
administration and public services work with low efficiency, with questionable productivity 
and inequitably for the large segments of society. (Worldbank [2009]); (Tóth [2009]) Based 
on these perceptions it is not accidental that in the more than twenty years that has passed 
since the political changes the comprehensive reform of the public sector had received a high 
priority during all governmental terms and probably this will be the case in the future as well.3 
Public sector reforms root even further back in time in the developed Western 
democracies than in Hungary, as it has been continuously on the agenda for the past 30 years. 
The utilization of the experiences accumulated in old European Union member states and in 
Anglo-Saxon countries is an obvious idea when considering the modernizing efforts of the 
Hungarian State. Reforms concerning the public sector that were realized in the West not only 
mean structural, system-wide changes, but also the same emphasis was put on the 
transformation of the management and managing principles of the public sphere. New Public 
Management (NPM) has played a decisive role in that after the millennium we can look at the 
performance of the Anglo-Saxon public sector as a leading example.4 The NPM movement 
has had a radical effect on the productivity and efficiency of the public sector in the United 
Kingdom, in New Zealand, in the United States and in Australia. As a result of the successes 
the NPM is almost a mandatory element of the governmental reform efforts, so it is not 
accidental that the adaptation of the NPM techniques and the learning process that go with 
them is financially supported by the European Union in the new member states as well. 
                                                           
1 According to the Eurobarometer survey of fall, 2009, 58% of the Hungarian public is dissatisfied with their 
lives, the picture is primarily unfavorable in the case of the 40-54 age group: 7 out of every 10 people are 
dissatisfied with their lives. In regards to their future prospects, 14% of Hungarians are optimistic while the 
decisive majority is pessimistic about their future. (EC [2009], pp. 2-5.) 
2 We can learn more about the great magnitude - even in international comparison - of the expectations set 
towards the state in the survey of Tárki, 2007. See: (Medgyesi – Tóth et al. [2007]). 
3 In 2009, under the SIGMA program the OECD and the EU published an interesting study about the public 
sector reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Data concerning Hungary are especially disappointing. (Meyer-
Sahling [2009]) 
4 The NPM movement has received numerous criticisms during the past decades, and as a result of the economic 
crisis reverse processes opposing to the mentality of the movement had taken place in the public sectors of the 
developed countries. We cannot cite unequivocally the New Zealand model anymore either. (Duncan – Chapman 
[2010]. In the dissertation I present the criticisms leveled at the NPM movement in details. 
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Consequently, even in Hungary significant amounts are at hand for the realization of the state 
reform, to which the governmental, public administration organizations can gain access 
mainly through the tenders run by the State Reform Operational Program.5 
However, the effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific 
community is zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing/less developed countries, 
including Central Eastern European countries. The story they are full of failures, and 
ineffective reforms or reforms with negative effects (Lodge – Gill [2011]), (Meyer-Sahling 
[2009]), (Beblavy [2002]), (Bouckaert et al. [2009]), (Marobela [2008]). According to our 
assumption, the NPM is not an everywhere applicable, globally adaptable integrated tool set; 
rather it is more like an approach and a value system, to which numerous management 
instruments can be fitted. According to our hypothesis the introduction of management 
methods belonging to this approach can only be effective, if these instruments fit the informal 
and formal institutional system followed and applied by the society of the given country. The 
institutional fit is necessary, but not sufficient condition of the successful introduction of a 
given NPM technique. The talent or inadequacy of the government that is carrying out the 
implementation, and the other external environmental factors that are prevailing in a given 
place and time can fundamentally influence the success of the implementation. In the current 
study we exclusively focus on the institutional factors. The reason behind is on the one hand 
that the institutional fit according to our hypothesis determines which reforms worth carrying 
out in a given institutional environment. On the other hand, a given society’s institutional 
system shows strong stability in the short- and in the mid-run, so in the given decision 
situation it should be considered as a basic condition, the knowledge of which has a 
fundamental importance for the decision makers. The objective of our study is to scientifically 
analyze and to answer the following question: Do informal and formal institutions that 
provide the cluster of institutions for the social and especially inside of that the economic and 
political processes influence, and if yes, then how and to what extent, the opportunities for the 
successful implementation of the management techniques being introduced under the rubric of 
the NPM movement?6 Besides this, the author of the study wishes to answer the question, if 
                                                           
5 The state reform programs supported by the previous government are categorized by the OECD under the NPM 
movement. See: (Meyer-Sahling [2009], p. 17.) 
6 The notion of the “cluster of institutions” is not used uniformly by the various authors. See: Gottlieb [1953] ties 
the notion to economic systems. The ideas of Gottlieb in Hungarian are summarized by Bara – Csaba – Gedeon 
([2000], pp. 18-19.). Acemoglu – Johnson – Robinson [2002] in their paper primarily associates the notion with 
property rights. In the current study, under the notion of the cluster of institutions we think of the informal 
institutions (norms, traditions, habits, the national culture as understood by Hofstede) embedded in the core 
texture of society and the formal institutions (legal system, as the constitution and laws), which with their 
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the above described hypothesis is confirmed: Can the reforms belonging to the NPM 
movement be successfully introduced and sustained in the long-run taking into account the 
cluster of institutions characteristic of Hungary? 
 
2. Hypotheses 
As all scientific work, the current study is also in quest for an answer to an anomaly. The 
author as a consultant has provided recommendations for the introduction of performance 
management instruments at numerous local governments, often held multi-day trainings and 
courses about the application and the methodology of the introduction of these management 
instruments belonging to the NPM movement. As a consultant, with his practical experiences 
and knowledge gained from the literature, he tried to aid Hungarian local governments to 
improve their organization, their productivity and efficiency with similar management 
instruments to the developed Western European practices. The experiences amassed show that 
the number of successful projects is significantly less than the projects ended with a failure (or 
with changes not applied or only surviving for the short-run). The research questions of this 
dissertation stem from this personal experience of failure. 
The public administration systems of the new EU member states, among them Hungary, 
are dysfunctional, their moment of inertia, their resistance against the application of the 
management instruments offered by the NPM movement is surprisingly large, the reasons of 
which is worth to be analyzed. How to explain this at the system level? Can the NPM 
movement be applied in Hungary, or our institutional system makes us unsuitable for their 
application from the outset? The question can be approached from several levels, however, 
the examples of Hungary and of the developing countries show that we are not faced with a 
change management problem at an organizational level; rather we are facing a puzzle at 
system level. 
Based on these, in the study we are searching for an answer to the question: What 
institutional factors play decisive roles in the effectiveness of the reforms related to the NPM 
movement?7 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
stability and strong social acceptance provide the efficiency of the social, economic and political process for the 
long run.   
7 From 2011, with the support of the European Union, as part of the Seventh Framework Programme, the public 
administration experts of 11 universities of 10 countries are searching for answers to similar research questions 
as posed in the current dissertation. The research titled Coordination for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the 
Future is attempting to evaluate the NPM. From Hungary, the Department of Public Policy and Management of 
the Faculty of Economics of the Corvinus University of Budapest takes part in the research with the leadership 
of Dr. György Jenei and Dr. György Hajnal. The outcomes of the research can be retrieved from the following 
homepage: www.cocops.eu.   
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Research questions: 
 
I. Do informal and formal institutions that provide the cluster of institutions influence, and if 
yes, then how and to what extent, the probability of the successful implementation of the 
reforms being introduced under the rubric of the NPM movement? 
 
Hypotheses associated with the question: 
 
1. A reform under rubric of the NPM movement will be unsuccessful most likely in a country, 
where informal institutions, in other words the values of the society, do not fit the value 
system of NPM. 
2. The influence of informal institutions prevails stronger in respect to the success of NPM 
reform, than the influence of formal institutions. If informal and formal institutions 
influence the likelihood of the success of a given reform in opposite ways, then the 
influence of informal institutions will prevail stronger, than will the influence of formal 
institutions.8 
 
II. What kind of institutional framework, in other words informal and formal institutional 
constellation, is necessary in a given country for successfully implementing a reform 
belonging to the NPM movement? 
 
Hypotheses associated with the question: 
 
3. For the success of a reform belonging to NPM movement there is a need for an informal 
institutional constellation that is aligned with the approach of NPM movement. Therefore, 
a society that is fundamentally pro-market and pro-competition, individualistic, 
characterized by small power distance, and has informal institutions with a high tolerance 
towards uncertainty, can adopt these reforms successfully. 
 
                                                           
8 The exact definitions of the formal and informal institutions are included in the dissertation. From the 
methodological point of view, here we only note that, when describing and evaluating the results we must take 
into consideration that it is not possible to comprehensively capture the notions of informal and formal 
institutions through proxy variables. We call attention to this methodological limitation in the dissertation. 
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4. For the success of a reform belonging to NPM movement there is a need for a formal 
institutional constellation that is aligned with the approach of the NPM movement. This 
assumes the support of decentralization and democratic political system.9 For the 
introduction and the execution of a NPM reform there is a need for significant political 
support. Thus, according to our hypothesis the individual electoral district type election 
system, that favors large political parties, facilitates better the success of the reforms, 
than the proportional electoral systems do. The legal system is also part of the formal 
institutions, so in this case, it can be assumed that the Anglo-Saxon traditions, the 
common law system fits the best the spirit of NPM reforms.  
 
III.  In which cases do informal and formal institutional factors strengthen and weaken each 
other’s influence with respect to the NPM reforms? 
 
Hypotheses associated with the question: 
 
5. According to our hypothesis, there is interaction between informal and formal factors, 
which influences the effect of the given factor on the success of NPM reforms. 
 
6. Informal institutions opposing the approach of NPM movement are offsetting the 
influence of those formal institutions that point to the same direction and the spirit of the 
NPM movement. Thereof in this case the implementation of NPM reform is likely to be 
doomed to end in failure.  
 
7. Formal institutions are able to prevent the successful implementation and application of 
NPM reform in the short-run, even in the case, when informal institutional factors point to 
the same direction of the value system of NPM. 
 
IV.  Can a successfully applied NPM reform from a given institutional environment be 
successfully replicated in another, different institutional environment? 
 
Hypothesis associated with the question: 
                                                           
9 Decentralization contributes to the stronger prevalence of the interests of the citizens, and at the same time it 
channels the scattered knowledge of the members of society into the community decision making. 
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8. A reform belonging to the NPM movement can be only successful through the existence of 
a specific cluster of institutions. In other words it cannot be replicated, and the reform 
will be unsuccessful in an environment that is at the opposite of the spirit of the NPM 
movement. 
 
V. Can the reforms belonging to the NPM movement be introduced and effectively sustained 
in the long-run, taking into account the cluster of institutions characteristic of Hungary? 
 
Hypothesis associated with the question: 
 
9. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so Hungary as well, have significantly 
different informal institutions and partly different formal institutions in comparison to the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Western European countries. Therefore the imitation of elsewhere 
successful NPM reforms, independent of all other circumstances, will be unsuccessful. 
 
3. Methodology 
Following the introduction of the hypotheses, our applied model is presented in this 
chapter. The model aims to answer the research questions, and to confirm or to reject the 
hypotheses. However, before the structure of our model is depicted in details, we wish to 
clarify the notion of the “model” in the social sciences. 
There are numerous definitions for the word “model” in the literature. (Hofstede [1981], 
p. 16.) As we see, the development of a scientific model is one of the decisive phases of the 
theory building process, when we attempt to analyze a social scientific phenomenon that has 
“relatively stable characteristics” (Leontief, [1986], p. 4. in: Hy - Wollscheid [2008], p. 788.) 
in a way that we are aware of the number of factors influencing the given phenomenon. 
Finally, we only concentrate on those that in our opinion are the most important ones. An 
important characteristic of the scientific model building is that it is based on the theories 
accepted by the scientific community and it can be tested empirically. The result of the test is 
accessible and reproducible by anyone. Thus, this way the models contribute to the 
development of science: by building on the theories accepted in the given time period, by 
either refuting or expanding them, they lead to new theories. 
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When developing our model we considered the above described principles. Thus, we set 
out from the theories of the new institutional school, and we only included in our analysis 
those explanatory variables responsible for the success of the reforms belonging to the NPM 
movement, which we considered as the most important ones. We quantified with the aid of 
proxy variables the given blocks of the model, in other words the informal and formal 
institutions. Following that by running the model with the help of statistical methods we 
tested our hypotheses. 
During the development of the model we set out from the model of Williamson ([1998] 
and [2000]), which by defining the possible time intervals of each institutional level 
establishes that informal institutions in the long-run (102 and 103 years), formal institution in 
the mid-run (10 and 102 years) are unchangeable, while the factors linked to the government 
can be changed even in the short-run (1 and 10 years). However, when collecting the data for 
the model, we did not take into account the Williamsonian time intervals assigned to each 
level. According to Williamson’s model in case of informal and formal institutions it would 
have been enough to gather data from only time period, from the 1980’s. However, we did not 
follow that, because Inglehart – Baker’s [2000] research unequivocally highlighted that the 
proxy variable used by us change even in the shorter-run. At the same time Inglehart – Baker 
([2000], p. 49.) point out that this does not contradict Williamson’s theory, since the changes 
in the data of the World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS) do not 
affect the core of culture. By assuming the changes of descriptive, independent variables, we 
do not make a mistake at all, at worst we are carrying out unnecessary work, as this way we 
can guarantee that the cause (independent variables) in time precede the effect (dependent 
variable). Data was chosen, following the logic of the model, so it always contains 
information from the preceding years of the reforms. Thus, in line with the implementation of 
the reforms in the case of some countries data was used from the 1980s,10 in the case of 
certain countries data was used from the 1990s,11 while in the case of the Central and Eastern 
European countries12 we used data from the 2000s. 
 
 
                                                           
10 This group includes the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Holland, Canada and New Zealand. 
11 Those countries, which carried out the reforms mostly during the 1990s: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Germany, Norway, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden. 
12 The following Central and Eastern European countries were included in the analysis: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. 
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Figure 1. 
The Economics of Institutions 
 
Source: Williamson ([2000], p. 597.)13 
 
                                                           
13 On the concept of polity used by (Williamson [2000]) see: (Urbán [1995], pp. 270-278.) 
Level Frequency Purpose 
Embeddedness: 
 
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, norms 
religion 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Institutional environment: 
 
formal rules of the game – 
esp. property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
Governance: 
 
play of the game – esp. 
Contract (aligning 
governance structures with 
transactions) 
Resource allocation and 
employment (prices and 
quantities; incentive 
alignment) 
102 to 103 
10 to 102 
1 to 10 
continuous 
Often noncalculative; 
spontaneous […] 
Get the institutional 
environment right. 
1st order economizing 
Get the governance 
structures right. 
2nd order economizing 
Get the marginal conditions 
right. 
3rd order economizing 
L3: transaction cost economics 
L 4: neoclassical economics / agency theory 
L 1: social theory 
L 2: economics of property rights / positive 
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Based on Figure 1, Williamson’s model is briefly introduced. The first level of the model 
contains those factors, which – according to our hypothesis – decisively influence the 
successful implementation of NPM reforms. These factors have been often considered even 
by the new institutional economists as givens. According to Williamson [1998], these include 
the rules that even unconsciously followed by the members of society. North ([1991], p. 97.) 
called this block informal institutions, and he classified social norms, traditions and habits 
under this group. It is in this block of our model, where we apply the notion of culture in 
Hofstede’s sense, since as Hofstede – Hofstede ([2008], p. 35.) writes: 
 
“The culture practically consists of the unwritten rules of the social game.” 
 
The second level contains those formal systems of rules that North [1984] calls formal 
institutions, and which include the system of property rights, the constitution and laws. These 
are the formal rules of the game, which obtain their form and become accountable in the 
social space created by informal institutions. 
The strength of the regulating power of formal institutions varies across cultures; in 
certain societies it is stronger, while in others it is weaker. The contribution of the formal 
institutions to the regulation of the social processes (as formal rules of the game) 
fundamentally depends on the informal institutions. In regards to these interrelations and 
mechanisms still numerous open questions exist, in any event based on the research the 
historical determination of these processes is clear. (Greif – Tabellini [2010]), (Greif [2006]) 
The changing of the formal rules of the game is also a slow process, which take place 
according to Williamson ([1998] p. 27.) primarily through the influence of external factors, so 
as a result of civil wars, economic crises, foreign occupation, collapse of political systems. 
For the third and forth factors, namely the changes of the government and the resource 
allocations, we can bring up examples from our lives as well. These levels usually pertain to 
the current workings of the system within the framework defined by the rules of the game 
established by the first and second levels. While the first two levels regulate what the social 
actors can do, on these levels the emphasis is placed on the question of how. 
The first block of our model includes the notion of national culture as well. According to 
Hofstede – Hofstede ([2008], pp. 38-43.) culture is built up like an onion. At its core, we can 
find those social values that are extremely resistant, so in time they rarely change and in a 
given moment they can be considered as unchangeable. Whereas the outer layers of the onion 
consisting of the rituals, heroes, symbols – that are jointly called by Hofstede as “practices” – 
 13 
change more easily and faster during the course of time. When combining Hofstede – 
Hofstede’s [2008] notion of culture and Williamson’s [1998] institutional economics we must 
keep in mind that the first level that is called by Williamson “embeddedness” basically 
corresponds to the inner core of Hofstede’s cultural onion, namely to the values. 
In the next section the model by which we wish to analyze the likelihood of the successful 
implementation of the NPM reforms is introduced. The model is quite simple, with a static 
structure, and it contains all together four explanatory and one outcome blocks. In Figure 2. 
the interactions between the various blocks are not indicated separately in order to simplify 
the introduction of the model, since the main direction of causality according to our 
hypothesis is clearly heading from block 1. through blocks 2, 3, and 4. to the outcome 
variable. All of this, however, does not mean that during the statistical analysis the 
interactions do not come to light, only that we find it sufficient to call attention to the main 
cause and effect interrelation, when illustrating the model.14 
During the analysis the data for 31 countries has been processed. Beside the 27 countries15 
of Europe we included in the analysis the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
The database of the European countries has been complemented with the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, because the NPM reform movement had developed the earliest and it transformed 
the public sphere at the most depth and width in these countries. (Barzelay [2001]) 
During the description of the model each of its blocks are depicted. Following the 
introduction of the independent variables, the measurement of the success of the NPM 
reforms are reviewed. Capturing the notion of success is key to the workings of the model, so 
our recommended technique is described in more details. The operationalization of success is 
necessary, when we wish to determine the likelihood of a successful implementation of an 
NPM reform. 
We will not deal in details with all blocks of our model, since for answering our research 
question it is sufficient to examine and to empirically test only the first two blocks and the 
success of the NPM reforms. The reason behind this is that primarily we are interested in the 
what question, in other words under what framework of conditions it is worth to set out to 
implement an NPM reform. As a result, we are exclusively focusing on the analysis of the 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions: we are examining the relationship between the 
                                                           
14 During the development of the model I was inspired by Kornai’s ([1993], pp. 380-388.) explanatory theory of 
the workings of socialism and the model related to that. 
15 The list of the European countries does not match the member countries of the European Union. The countries 
included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, United Kingdom, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Croatia, Ireland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Germany, Norway, Italy, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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informal and formal institutional system and the reforms belonging to the NPM movements. 
According to our hypothesis there will be a strong correlation between the first two blocks of 
the model (informal and formal institutions) and the successful implementation and 
application of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement. The analysis does not cover the 
examination of the necessary conditions (3. and 4. blocks) Therefore, in the case of those 
countries of which we can state that their reform attempt was futile, we cannot decide whether 
it was unsuccessful, because the approach and set of instruments of the NPM movement did 
not fit the institutional system of the country, or merely the decision makers of the given time 
period did not possess the appropriate competence and skills for the successful 
implementation of an NPM reform or the interrelations between the NPM reforms being 
introduced impede the successful reforms.16 Therefore, based on the current study an answer 
will be given to the following question: the realized forms of NPM reforms are compatible 
with the institutional system of which countries, and with which they are not. The exact 
reasons behind the futility of a reform belonging to the NPM movement can be only 
uncovered by the analysis of the third block (governmental competences and skills) and the 
forth block (the interrelations between the simultaneously introduced NPM reforms). This 
analysis includes the examination of the political and economic and other social processes at a 
given time and space, as well as the organizational culture of a given country’s public sector. 
In other words all the factors, which a leader possessing the appropriate knowledge and 
experience is able to influence.17 Besides the above, during the analysis those external factors 
must be also taken into account that cannot be influenced by the decision makers, and which 
define the decision makers’ playing field in a given time period and space. These factors 
cannot be built into the model, but these factors should be also taken into consideration in an 
analysis that goes beyond the current study. 
However, beside the above limitations we would like to call attention to that based on our 
analysis even in the case of the unsuccessful countries we will be able to decide with a great 
probability – but unequivocally – whether a given country was incapable of successful 
implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement, because of its institutional 
                                                           
16 However, by the analysis of the first two blocks we can gain information about the third block as well. As 
Pillay ([2008], p. 380.) states: „ Generally speaking, managers and leaders, as well as the people they work with, 
are part of a national society. In understanding their behaviour, one has to understand the society they live and 
function in.” 
17 The analysis of the reforms that influence each other in a given time period is to be particularly emphasized. 
During the introduction of the NPM reforms there can be an optimal order, which is to be followed by the 
decision makers in order to achieve success. Besides this, certain NPM instruments formulate conflicting 
expectations and objectives, so their concurrent introduction – because of the conflicting objectives - will lead to 
failure. 
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system or other factors, such as the lack of government abilities that caused the failure. If a 
country’s institutional system is the same, or mainly similar, to the ones of the successful 
countries and yet its attempt to implement the NPM reforms was futile, then in the case of this 
country we can assume that the failure was not caused by the relationship to the institutional 
factors, rather it is explained by other causes, for instance it is linked to the government’s 
abilities and the organizational culture dominant in the public sector. 
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1. block, informal institutions
18
 
 
Informal institutions are the rules, unconsciously accepted and spontaneously followed by 
the individual, which make social coordination more fluent. They are the most efficient 
coordination instruments of the relationships between the many millions of actors making up 
society with various individual interests. Informal institutions change slowly, which is one of 
their main virtues, but this characteristic of theirs has drawbacks as well. They provide 
security in the changing world, but they hinder the development of the given society. It is 
difficult to say how informal institutions arise. Fundamentally they are a product of a learning 
process, which stems from the collective processing of past events. Societies experience a 
great deal of internal and external influences during their history. The survival of a given 
group/society depends on the successful answers given to these influences. The repeatedly 
successful solutions become embedded in the subconscious of the members of society and 
they help the successful adaptation of the members of society in the long-run. Embeddedness 
also means that the members of society unconsciously rely on these informal institutions for 
the solution of certain situations.  
Informal institutions, independent of which definition we begin with, are intertwined with 
the notion of culture.19 According to Hofstede ([1984], p. 389.): 
 
“Culture can be defined as the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another.” 
 
Hofstede’s definition allows for a broad interpretation, in any case the “collective 
programming of the mind” highlights certain characteristics of culture. Programming means 
that the system automatically answers to certain effects with a given response. Capturing 
culture through programming makes it clear that informal institutions like traditions, also 
called by North informal constraints, are identical notions to culture, at least from the 
perspective of that both culture and the informal institutions are the efficient coordinating 
instruments of social – including even the economic and political – transactions.
                                                           
18 See the proxy variables of the informal institutions in the dissertation.   
19 This is also stated by Pejovich ([1999], p. 166.): “Thus, informal institutions are the part of a community’s 
heritage that we call culture.” 
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2. block, formal institutions20 
Following Williamson in the second block we wish to capture formal institutions. 
Williamson ([1998], p. 27. and [2000], p. 598.) classifies the following into the second block: 
public policy decision making, legislation and bureaucracy, the constitution, laws and 
property rights. Williamson ([2000], p. 598.) defines the second block as the following: 
 
„Constrained by the shadow of the past, the design instruments at Level 2 include the 
executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the 
distribution of powers across different levels of government (federalism). The definition 
and enforcement of property rights and of contract laws are important features.” 
 
This definition is very important in regards to the selection of the proxy variables! In order 
to capture the second block, it worth to capture the following with proxy variables: legal 
system, political system – including for instance the electoral system, the relationship and the 
distribution of power between the local government system and the central government. In 
addition to this of course, we must measure in some way the strength of property rights and 
contract enforcement, when we include this block into our model. 
The further characteristic of formal institutions is that they increase the stability of the 
workings of society by extorting the expected conforming behaviour from the members of 
society. This is necessary, because social actors only follow informal institutions with a 
certain probability; the possibility of deviant behaviour always exists. This characteristic 
assumes that formal institutions mainly stem from informal institutions. 
                                                           
20 See the proxy variables of the formal institutions in the dissertation. 
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The capturing methods of success 
Following the short introduction of the independent variables, a review of capturing the 
success of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement is presented. All together 31 
democratic market economies are analysed at the system level, where the analytical units are 
nation-states, which are examined based on their reforms realized in various time intervals 
(1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010). The time intervals of the analysis are short- and mid-
run, so in the case of New Zealand the realized reforms taking place between 1980 and 1990 
are considered as successful despite that from 2000 more and more criticism has been 
expressed in regards to the effectiveness of the reforms. (Duncan – Chapman [2010]) (Lodge 
– Gill [2011]) Our objective is to provide a comprehensive, holistic analysis of the NPM 
reforms, we are not examining certain sectors and certain solutions, rather we decide based on 
professional publications about the realized reforms in the given decades, and based on the 
composite indicators developed by us, like the citizen interest indicator and the political 
interest indicator. Decisions made based on the literature are not unambiguous, since it is 
conceivable that another researcher to a certain extent could come to a different conclusion. 
This can even be the result of personal judgment, but it can also be the result of that he or she 
has read other studies. In order to arrive to a scientifically provable conclusion, during the 
analysis of the statistical model we will examine how robust the measurement results of 
success are. For the sake of this, we will attempt to capture the success of the reforms 
belonging to the NPM movement in several ways. 
 
The success of the NPM reforms based on the literature 
In our dissertation we will try to capture the success of the NPM reforms all together in 
three ways. One of the approaches is based on the analysis of the literature. In doing so, the 
following procedure was used. Each country’s success in the implementation of the NPM 
reforms in the given decade is classified on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 was the best and 1 
was the worst value. Based on the literature analyzed, which means several hundreds of 
journal articles and books cited in the references, an expert estimation of the success of the 
given reforms is provided. A judgment on success is made based on the breadth and the depth 
of the reforms. By breadth we mean which sectors of the public sector and which levels of 
public administration (central government, levels of local governments) were affected by the 
reforms. By depth we mean the institutionalization of the realized reforms (how enduring is 
the influence of the given reform) and their diversity (what kind of NPM instruments were 
used). In the case of each country, at least four independent expert analyses are taken into 
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consideration, out of which at least two was written by the expert of the given country. During 
the selection of the studies analyzed, we aimed to develop our conclusions based on the 
evaluation of as many sectors and as many NPM solutions as possible. 
 
The success of the NPM reforms based on the citizen interest indicator 
We developed the citizen interest indicator (CII) based on the public choice theory. Our 
starting point was that the NPM aspires to maximally satisfy citizens’ needs and based on this 
it sets up a clear hierarchy among the stakeholders of the public sector. Citizens are at the top 
of the hierarchy, and in democratic countries they decide by secret and general elections on 
who can hold possession of the political power. The objective of the politicians is the seizure 
of political power, thus they are forced to compete for the patronage of the citizens. 
Bureaucrats also follow self-interest pursuing, rational behaviour and they wish to attain their 
own selfish objectives. Their administrative authority by which they can attain their objectives 
stems from and depends on politicians, so bureaucrats are forced to keep in mind the interests 
of the politicians as well. The relationships between the various actors are characterized by 
asymmetric and incomplete information, by the rational ignorance of the citizens, and by the 
better advocacy skills of the smaller groups Thus the above described interconnection of 
interest does not prevail entirely. NPM reforms wish to change this and they aim to enforce 
the interests of the citizens as strongly as possible.  
Based on the above logic the CII aims to capture the objectives of the citizens. When 
devising the indicator on the one hand we set out from that through public institutions they 
should get as good quality of public services as possible. On the other hand all these services 
should be provided by the public sector at the lowest cost possible, since these expenditures 
are financed by the tax payers. Public services were captured though three areas: healthcare, 
education and employment policy. 
Healthcare level was captured through the infant mortality rate indicator, to which data 
was gathered from the OECD Health Data database, and in the case of Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Croatia the Eurostat database was used. 
Education level was measured by the Education Index of the Human Development Index 
that basically contains two variables. One measures the ability to read and write, while the 
other gives an indication of the number of students enrolled in school at several different 
grade levels. 
For the third indicator of the level of public services the indicator of the working age 
employment rate for people between the ages of 15 and 64 was chosen. The source of the data 
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is the OECD. (OECD [2010/a]) The employment rate was included in the indicator, because 
according to the surveys of the Eurobarometer, citizens consider losing their job as the biggest 
social threat they might face. 
The study of Tanzi and Schuknecht [1997] also confirms that the three above described 
indicators are suitable for the measurement of state interests. In our opinion, social welfare is 
in some manner related among others to infant mortality, secondary school enrolment and the 
unemployment rate.21 We believe that the unemployment rate in terms of social welfare is less 
informative, than the rate that indicates the number of working age people actually working in 
a society. The unemployment rate is an indicator that is more easily influenced by a given 
government or in many cases certain groups of society fall outside of the scope of this 
indicator. 
Based on Hood ([1995], p. 103.) the resources spent on public services, which also define 
the size of the state, can be measured by four statistical indicators: (1) general government 
sector employment in percentage of total employment, (2) general government final 
consumption expenditure in percentage of GDP, (3) social security spending in percentage of 
GDP, (4) tax revenues in percentage of GDP. 
Since public expenditures are primarily financed by taxes, the tax revenue in percentage 
of GDP is an important indicator of the size of the state and its expenditures. The cost of 
public services is mostly perceived by the people through taxes.22 The magnitude of taxation 
was established based on the data from the OECD ([2009], pp. 76-78.) and on the study of 
Lupi [2010] introducing the Eurostat data. 
Hood [1995] did not take into account that the state can live beyond its means, in other 
words, it can have more expenditures than revenues, which can be sourced from the 
international financial markets. For measuring this, the general government gross dept in 
percentage of GDP indicator was utilized. 
Based on Hood [1995], for an indicator of the size of state the general government sector 
employment in percentage of total employment indicator was utilized. This indicator, as the 
previous one, do not cover the entire public sector, rather it remains in the confines of the 
                                                           
21 As Tanzi – Schuknecht ([1997], p. 167.) put it: „The relationship between these indicators and general welfare 
is of course more obvious for some than for others; but in all cases an argument can be made that changes in 
them should affect the general welfare.” 
22 The various taxes are perceived by the people at various magnitudes. In regards to this we must mention the 
Mill hypothesis, according to which indirect taxes are less perceptible for the citizens and because of that they 
underestimate them. See on this in more details: (Sausgruber – Tyran [2005]) 
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general government. Unfortunately, there was no available data for the entire public sector in 
the case of either indicator.23 
Finally, as an indicator the general government final consumption expenditure in 
percentage of GDP was also applied. Hood [1995], Rodric [1996] and many other authors 
capture the size of the state by the rate of the expenditures of the general government 
compared to the GDP. This indicator is suitable to characterize the size of the state, but it does 
not examine where the state spends the certain percentage of the GDP. An expenditure 
indicator that fits better to the objectives of the CII would focus on the public services and 
public procurements. The data for the general government final consumption expenditure in 
percentage of GDP indicator is sourced from the Development Indicators database of the 
World Bank. 
Following the introduction of the various indicators, one can ask: so how is the citizens’ 
interest indicator pieced together? When calculating the indicators, from the three variables 
measuring the quality of the services by weighting them equally an indicator describing the 
quality of the public services was developed, and from the four variables measuring 
government expenditures by weighting them equally as well, an indicator measuring 
governmental expenditures was created.24 In both cases the given elements were standardized, 
so for indicators that were improving in a reverse direction, like the infant mortality rate, we 
turned them around in a way so in the new indicator the higher values would point towards 
the positive direction.25 After all this, the three and in the case of the expenditures the four 
now standardized dimensions were averaged. 
The CII in reality is an index that measures efficiency, since we divide the value 
calculated from the quality indicators by the values calculated from the expenditures 
indicators: 
 
                                                           
23 Employment data is mainly sourced from the Economic Outlook database of the OECD [2010/b], while in the 
case of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and Croatia we collected the data on the number of 
people employed in the public sector from the ILO database. We established the proportion of the total number 
of people employed in the same six countries based on the Eurostat database, and we sourced the data for all 
other countries from the Economic Outlook database of the OECD. 
24 The application of equal weights is the same kind of decision as if we used varying weights. It would be 
possible to weight the indicators according to the Eurobarometer, in other words based on what the citizens of 
the European countries consider as more important problems. Accordingly, education would receive a multiplier 
of one, health would get two and employment would be given four. In our opinion however, it is difficult to 
decide which should be considered more important, since aside from the above methodology we could weight 
them based on other methodologies as well, so for instance based on the proportion the countries included spend 
on average on their education, or their healthcare and employment policy systems. Since the importance of the 
three public services depends on the circumstances, we decided that they are equally important for society. 
25 This means that for instance a lower rate of infant mortality will receive a higher value in the indicator. 
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CII = Quality of public services / Magnitude of government expenditures 
 
Since for capturing the success of the NPM reforms we are interested in the changes of 
this indicator, we calculated with the steepness of the indicators, in other words with the 
magnitude of the changes during a given time interval in the case of each country (for 
instance in the case of the United Kingdom the steepness of the employment data during the 
time period between 1980-1990). We started out from the assumption that those countries, 
which had better values even in the beginning of the time period under examination, can only 
achieve a smaller improvement in the given decade. This will be corrected in the model by the 
filtering out of the effect of the measured average of the CII in the given decade. 
The indicator developed this way, as all composites indices, aside from its advantages, has 
significant disadvantages as well. Numerous such factors may influence the value of the 
indicator, in the case of which the effect of the NPM reforms is difficultly demonstrable, or it 
is independent of it. Besides this, citizens have numerous other interests, for instance for 
certain individuals equality, the principle of solidarity are more important, or at least as 
important as self-interest. Based on public choice theory, the current indicator assumes self-
interested citizens, which not necessarily reflects reality. 
 
The success of the NPM reforms based on the politicians’ interest indicator 
During the development of the politicians’ interest indicator (PII) we started out from the 
assumption that under democratic circumstances elected politicians compete for re-election. 
To achieve this, the objective of the politicians is to have the trust of the citizens grow in the 
public administration led by them and indentified with them, and to have themselves re-
elected personally. The indicator contains two variables with equal weights. One originates 
from the databases of the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey, and it 
measures the citizens’ trust in the public administration. The other indicator shows the 
number of prime ministers in office during the given decade in the given country. The 
magnitude of trust towards the public administration was analysed based on the first WVS / 
EVS surveys after the NPM reforms. 
The other indicator is the number of prime ministers in office for the given decades. This 
indicator specifically measures the change in the primarily leader of the country. Since we 
wish to capture the political stability of the politicians and not the stability of the political 
system and the political parties, we are not looking at the number of government changes; 
rather the changes in the person of the prime minister was considered. 
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The big advantage of the indicator is that it is simple, but at the same time that is the 
source of its shortcomings as well. One the one hand, the change in the person of the prime 
minister does not cover all sectors and public administration levels affected by the NPM 
reform. It can also give rise to further headaches that a decline in the trust towards public 
administration does not necessarily cause immediate political losses, since it is conceivable 
that a politician can compensate by other results / symbolic actions the weaker performance 
attained in this area. The chief shortcoming of the indicator is that numerous uncontrollable 
factors can influence its value, and it is not exclusively dependent on the performance of the 
NPM reforms. In our opinion, in the case of those countries, where the NPM reforms became 
the focal point of public discourse during the decade under investigation, the NPM reforms 
significantly influenced the value of this indicator. As Pollitt ([2007], pp. 10-25.) also 
considers discursive convergence as the strongest, we share this opinion, that the NPM 
reforms in most Anglo-Saxon and Northern and Western European countries has determined 
the public discourse, while we have to admit that in case of the Central and Eastern European 
countries this is less true.26 
 
The description of the statistical analysis 
Our model, which was developed with the help of the above described variables, was 
verified through statistical methods and secondary sources. We used SPSS software for the 
statistical running of the model. First, the number of the proxy variables used for capturing the 
informal and formal institutions found on the left side of the model was reduced. To achieve 
this, a principal component analysis was carried out. 
                                                           
26 In his book chapter Van de Walle [2007] measured the magnitude of trust towards the public sector by the 
question of the WVS, which was also applied by us. In his writing he identified numerous problems related to 
this question of the WVS, among others for instance that the English term civil service was translated differently 
in the various countries. In the Hungarian survey the term „közigazgatás” is used. Based on the analysis of Van 
de Walle [2007] we can state that the socio-demographic and the socio-economic variables explain to only a very 
small extent the level of trust towards the public administration. The research of Listhaug – Wiberg [1995] 
quoted by Van de Walle ([2007], p. 183.) arrived to the same conclusion as well. These results suggest that we 
have a very good reason to believe that there is a strong relationship between the values of the PII and the 
success of the NPM reforms. 
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Figure 3.  
The values of the informal and formal intuitional factors in the case of the 31 countries 
 
 
Source: Own figure27 
 
After the principle component analysis, several versions of our model were developed to 
test the reliability of our results. All variations are based on the path analysis model, which 
consists of the series of related multivariate linear regressions. The success of the NPM 
reforms is captured through the three ways we have described already, in other words through 
a 10 item success scale based on the literature, which was also tested with a 5 item success 
                                                           
27 The high values of the principle component of informal institutions are characteristic of such societies, where 
the people have the following self-image: they are satisfied with their lives, the direction of which according to 
their opinion can be influenced by them, and they experience and express the joys of life. They turn to each other 
with trust, they tolerate social differences, and they think liberally about the world, power distance between 
people is small. They think as individuals, in other words individual freedom is important for them, they are 
willing to take risks, and they do not expect the state to create their welfare. They do not support the intervention 
of the state either in the economy or in their lives; rather they feel confidence in themselves, in the market and in 
free competition. When setting their objectives they rather focus on the short-run. Based on this description the 
countries, having high values for the principal component developed from the variables of the informal 
institutions, are tolerant, pro-market and pro-competition, individualist societies built on mutual trust with post 
modern value systems (Inglehart [1999]), and their objective is to maximize individual happiness. 
The high values of the principle component of formal institutions is characteristic of such countries, which have 
Scandinavian type legal system, proportional and party list electoral system and they have such unicameral 
parliament in which there is a high proportion of female representatives. In addition, in these countries the 
position of local governments is stabile; they have significant resources, which are complemented by significant 
authority and human resources. The Anglo-Saxon legal traditions, the electoral system built on simple majority, 
or the bicameral parliament have a negative correlation with the value of the principle component. 
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scale, through the citizens’ interest indicator and through the politicians’ interest indicator. 
Before running the model and presenting the results we would like to highlight one important 
condition. We consider the 31 countries included in the analysis as the population, in other 
words we do not consider the countries chosen by us as a sample. It follows that the 
conclusions of this study cannot be applied to and generalized for the other countries of the 
world. The reason for this is that the subject of our analysis, the NPM movement, is only able 
to exert positive influence in a democratic and pro-market environment, since the roots of the 
movement go back to such economic theories, which cannot be applied in authoritarian and 
anti-market environments. There is an important methodological implication of that, we 
consider the countries included in the analysis as a population and not a sample, since this 
way the significance level analysis loses its importance. In addition, there is no need for those 
analyses that assess in what magnitude the sample fits the characteristics of the population.28 
The path analysis models are in reality a series of regression models suitable for testing 
the cause and effect relationship deductively devised by the researcher.29 By developing a 
path analysis model a probable causal direction can be tested. The causality applied in the 
current study is the following: 
 
Figure 4.  
The direction of the causality of the model (exogenous variable: informal institutions) 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
We know that numerous other factors influence the success of the NPM reforms (see for 
instance the 3. and the 4. blocks of our model), however we will obtain their combined 
influence and not the influence of each factor by itself. Let us assume that in regards to the 
                                                           
28 So there is no need for multicollinearity analysis either (Székelyi – Barna [2002], pp. 274-277). Based on 
Székelyi – Barna ([2002], p. 318.) we also know that: „In case of the path analysis models there is need for 
interdependency between the variables of the model, and because of this at least in the first run version of the 
model (if all variables are included – I inserted the authors’ own footnote into the text – M.R.) there is a specific 
need for multicollinearity.” 
29 The linear multivariate regression analysis is explained in details by numerous books (Székely –Barna [2002], 
pp. 227-252), (Hunyadi – Mundruczó – Vita [1996], pp. 673-739.), so we can set aside the methodological 
introduction. The limitations of the path analysis models are discussed in Székelyi – Barna ([2002], pp. 318-
319.) 
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success of the NPM reforms the combined explanatory power of the independent variables 
included in our model is 25%, then the influence of the other variables explains it in 75%. 
Aside from the causal direction mentioned above, we also analyze that if we assume that 
the formal institutions influence the informal institutions, then what results would we get. 
 
Figure 5.  
The causal direction of the model (exogenous variable: formal institutions) 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
There is a significant theoretical difference between the two directions, in terms of 
methodology the question is: do we consider the informal institutions or the formal 
institutions as the exogenous variable? We could also assume a symmetrical relationship 
between the two factors, so the arrow between them could point into both directions. 
However, we will not get numerical differences between the two approaches.30 In addition, an 
important characteristic of path analysis models is that all variables included in the model are 
controlled by the previous variables in the model.  
After running the path analysis models we can state that while as in the literature we 
found a strong correlation between the success of the NPM reforms captured by the 
politicians’ interest indicator and the informal and formal institutions, we did not establish a 
relationship between the success measured by the citizens’ interest indicator and the cluster of 
institutions. The results of the statistical analysis of our model highlight that there is a strong 
and clear relationship between the success of the NPM reforms and informal institutions, 
while the effects of formal institutions are significantly more modest. 
 
 
                                                           
30 This has computational reasons. In this case, when we use one independent and one dependent variable during 
the application of linear regression, then when we estimate the variables, the value of the standardized regression 
coefficient (beta), which is associated with the dependent variable, will not change. It helps the understanding if 
we imagine a coordinate system, in which the linear regression line is located. If we switch the two variables, 
then in reality this means the same as switching the x and the y axes, whereby the character of the line remains 
the same. Further explanation is that in the case of the bivariate regression (in the case of one dependent and one 
independent variable) the value of the regression beta is equal to the value of the correlation between the two 
variables. However, correlation is a symmetrical metrics. 
Formal 
institutions 
Informal 
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The success of NPM 
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4. Results 
Following the evaluation of the models, now we can provide answers to the research 
questions of the current study. Let us look at our questions and hypotheses! 
 
Our first question was the following: 
 
I. Do informal and formal institutions that provide the cluster of institutions influence, and if 
yes, then how and to what extent, the probability of the successful implementation of the 
reforms being introduced under the rubric of the NPM movement? 
 
The following hypotheses were linked to the question: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A reform under rubric of the NPM movement will be unsuccessful with great 
likelihood in a country, where informal institutions, in other words the values of the society, 
do not fit the value system of the NPM. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The influence of informal institutions prevails stronger in respect of the success 
of the NPM reform, than the influence of formal institutions. If informal and the formal 
institutions influence the likelihood of the success of a given reform in opposite ways, then the 
influence of informal institutions will prevail stronger, than will the influence of formal 
institutions. 
 
Our answer: Based on our analysis, informal institutions significantly influence the 
likelihood of the successful implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement, 
and they drastically reduce the uncertainty associated with it. We claim that those countries 
are able to successfully implement the management techniques belonging to this reform 
movement, where informal institutions are compatible with the approach of the NPM reforms, 
in other words where social norms support liberal, pro-market and pro-competition values. 
The NPM reforms strongly rely on the private sector, on the power of the market. For this, 
there is a need for a well functioning market economy, the essential prerequisite of which is 
that the members of society have confidence in themselves, they should be entrepreneurial, 
and they should not wait for the state to solve their problems. Those values, norms, habits, 
traditions and national culture, which were captured by the positive values of the principal 
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component of informal institutions, are closely fitting to the value system of the NPM 
reforms. 
Based on the statistical model we claim that the principle component of the formal 
institutions, by which the legal and political formal institutions of the countries analyzed were 
described, much more modestly influences the likelihood of the success of the NPM reforms, 
than the principle component capturing the informal part of the cluster of institutions. 
Therefore, a reform belonging to the NPM movement can be successful even if formal 
institutions of the given country do not support this, as long as informal institutions support 
the implementation and realization of the reform. 
Based on the above and in view of the results of the statistical analysis, we confirm 
and accept both of our hypotheses related to our first research question.  
 
Our second question was the following: 
 
II. What kind of institutional framework, in other words informal and formal institutional 
constellation, is necessary in a given country for successfully implementing a reform 
belonging to the NPM movement? 
 
The following hypotheses were linked to the question: 
 
Hypothesis 3: For the success of a reform belonging to the NPM movement there is a need for 
an informal institutional constellation that is aligned with approach of the NPM movement. 
Therefore, a society that is fundamentally pro-market and pro-competition, individualistic, 
characterized by small power distance, and has informal institutions with a good tolerance 
towards uncertainty, can adopt these reforms successfully. 
 
Hypothesis 4: For the success of a reform belonging to the NPM movement there is a need for 
a formal institutional constellation that is aligned with the approach of the NPM movement. 
This assumes the support of decentralization and democratic political system.31 For the 
introduction and execution of an NPM reform there is a need for significant political support. 
Thus, according to our hypothesis the individual electoral district type election system, that 
favors large political parties, facilitates better the success of the reforms, than the 
                                                           
31 Decentralization contributes to the stronger prevalence of the interests of the citizens, and at the same time it 
channels the scattered knowledge of the members of society into the community decision making. 
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proportional electoral systems do. The legal system is also the part of the formal institutions, 
so in this case we assume that the Anglo-Saxon traditions, the common law system fits the 
best the spirit of the NPM reforms.  
 
Our answer: The reforms belonging to the NPM movement will most likely be 
successful, if they are introduced in the cluster of institutions that fits the approach of the 
movement. Thus, the likelihood of the successful implementation is larger in such societies, 
where the members of society trust each other and the political institutions, satisfied with their 
lives and their financial state, individualists, confident in themselves and able to tolerate 
uncertainty and diversity, and have postmodern value systems. In case of formal institutions, 
our analysis did not yield such clear results. What we can claim with great likelihood is that 
the individual district electoral system fits better to the approach of the NPM reforms than the 
proportional electoral system, and the Anglo-Saxon legal origins fit better the NPM reforms 
than the Scandinavian legal origins, but even these statements do not mean a really decisive 
difference. Based on our analysis we can claim that it is not formal institutions that define the 
success of the NPM reforms, their influence is minimal compared to the influence of informal 
institutions.  
On this basis we can confirm our third hypothesis, while in the case of our forth 
hypothesis we did not get a clear answer. 
 
Our third research question was the following: 
 
III. In which cases do informal and formal institutional factors strengthen and weaken each 
other’s influence with respect to the NPM reforms? 
 
Our hypotheses associated with the question: 
 
Hypothesis 5: According to our hypothesis, there exists an interaction between informal and 
formal factors, which influences the effect of the given factor on the success of the NPM 
reforms. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Informal institutions opposing the approach of the NPM movement are 
offsetting the influence of those formal institutions that point to the same direction and the 
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spirit of the NPM movement, so in this case the implementation of the NPM reform is with 
great probability doomed to end in failure. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Formal institutions are able to prevent the successful implementation and 
application of the NPM reform in the short-run, even in the case, when informal institutional 
factors point to the same direction of the value system of the NPM. 
 
Our answer: We found a weak connection between informal and formal institutions. The 
strength of the relationship depends on those factors by which the institutional factors were 
captured. Since in regards to the success of the NPM reforms, informal institutions are 
dominant, so based on our analysis in case of any formal institutional constellation – 
characteristic of a liberal democracy and a market economy – the implementation of an NPM 
reform can be successful. 
If we examine our hypotheses associated with the question, we can state that out of 
these our results only confirmed our sixth hypothesis, and not the other two – the fifth 
and the seventh – therefore we rejected them. 
We rejected our fifth hypothesis, because based on our analysis it is not proved that the 
interaction between the informal and the formal factors would significantly influence the 
probability of whether we can successfully implement an NPM reform or not. Our sixth 
hypothesis was confirmed by our analysis, because the influence of formal institutions is 
compensated by informal institutions, while formal institution cannot do the same. We clearly 
confuted our seventh hypothesis with our analysis: formal institutions are not able to offset 
the influence of informal institutions even in the short-run, in other words, if informal 
institutions fit the values of the NPM reforms, then their implementation will be successful 
with great probability. Let us not forget that our models do not explain success in 100%, so 
the fitting of informal institutions only a necessary, but not sufficient condition of the 
successful implementation! 
 
Our forth research question was the following: 
 
IV. Can a successfully applied NPM reform from a given institutional environment be 
successfully replicated in another, different institutional environment? 
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Our hypothesis associated with the question: 
 
Hypothesis 8: A reform belonging to the NPM movement can be only successful through the 
existence of a specific cluster of institutions, in other words it cannot be replicated, and the 
reform will be unsuccessful in an environment that is at the opposite of the spirit of the NPM 
movement.  
 
Our answer: Based on our study only a more complex answer can be provided to this 
research question. Since according to our results the influence of informal institutions 
dominates, an NPM reform can be successfully replicated in such institutional environment, 
where informal institutions are the same, even when formal institutions differ. This is the case 
for the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian countries: in regards to the NPM reforms the 
relevant informal institutional factors are almost the same. It is also important to highlight that 
the informal institutions of these countries are not completely identical, so the NPM reforms 
are realized differently. Imitation, simple copying would not have been successful even in this 
case, as knowledge and experience sharing can only be successful, if they are fitted to the 
informal institutions of the given country. The more different the informal institutional 
systems of two countries, the bigger the chance of failure during the adaptation, and all the 
more the NPM reforms to be implemented must be modified. Beyond a certain level of 
institutional dissimilarity, reforms reflecting the values of the NPM movement can be realized 
only with a very small probability. In the case of the countries that have culture significantly 
differing from the values of the NPM movement, other types of reforms can be successful 
with greater probability. These can even lead to similar results as the NPM reforms. This 
question however demands further research. Based on the current study we cannot provide a 
scientifically valid answer to the question of what type of reforms could lead to similar results 
in the Central and Eastern European countries.  
Based on the above, we can confirm and accept our eighth hypothesis on the basis of 
the results of this study. 
 
Our forth research question was the following: 
 
V. Can the reforms belonging to the NPM movement be introduced and effectively sustained 
in the long-run taking into account the cluster of institutions characteristic of Hungary? 
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Our hypothesis associated with the question: 
 
Hypothesis 9: The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so Hungary as well, have 
significantly different informal institutions and partly different formal institutions in 
comparison to the Anglo-Saxon and the Western European countries, therefore the imitation 
of elsewhere successful NPM reforms, independent of all other circumstances, will be 
unsuccessful. 
 
Our answer: Based on the cluster of institutions characteristic of Hungary, we can render 
it probable that the implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement will be 
unsuccessful and the implemented reforms will not be sustainable in the long-run. Hungary 
can be characterized by such informal institutions, which are conflicting with the values of the 
NPM movement. Based on the statistical analysis of the data of the EVS from 1999, the 
following picture develops about the informal institutions of the Hungarian society: the 
country can be characterized by a medium level of trust and the majority of the member of 
society is dissatisfied with their lives. Among the Central and Eastern European countries 
included in the analysis, Hungarians have the least confidence in the markets, and the most 
support for bureaucratic coordination. This is understandable in light of the fact that the 
majority of the population feels that they do not control their lives; rather it is external factors 
that influence its course. Hungarians – based on the analysis – are highly intolerant, are rather 
uncertainty avoiders, and can be characterized by strongly conservative attitudes. Also, their 
relationships are characterized by high power distance. 
Based on this we can claim that the approach of the NPM movement is foreign to the 
traditions of the Hungarian society, significantly differs from the norms and traditions 
accepted by the members of society. Because of the social norms and culture, the Hungarian 
public administration most likely will not be able to accept the reform concepts suggested by 
the NPM movement, either during their implementation or during their operations they will 
fall through. It is conceivable that instruments belonging to certain NPM movements will 
survive in the longer run, but they will be distorted and they will adjust to the informal 
institutions of Hungary, and cannot be characterized by the values of the NPM. Based on the 
literature we can claim that in these cases these instruments do more harm than good for the 
public sector of the given country. During the reform of the Hungarian public sector the 
toolkit of the NPM movement should not be applied or imitated in its entirety, it should be 
fitted to the Hungarian institutional environment, which could demand such levels of 
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modifications after which we cannot consider the modified instruments as a part of the NPM 
movement anymore. Out of the practices of the more developed countries, it worth to examine 
principally the public sector reforms of the Southern European countries, since the informal 
institutions of these countries stand the closest to ours, or we have to find our independent 
way to go. We believe that we should rather choose the later path. 
Based on the above we accept our ninth hypothesis. 
 
5. Main findings and summary 
In our work we wanted to find the answer to the question: what factors influence the 
successful implementation of the reforms belonging to the new public management 
movement. According to our assumption, the cluster of institutions that defines social 
interactions, in other words informal and formal institutions influence the most the 
implementation of the NPM reforms. 
In the introduction of the dissertation we described our approach and that why we 
consider the topic analyzed by us as relevant. In addition, in a separate chapter we discussed 
the research questions and the hypotheses of the study. 
In the next chapter of the dissertation, the NPM movement was introduced in details, its 
approach, its foundations in economic theory, the instruments belonging to the movement and 
the criticisms levelled at it. We captured the objectives of the NPM based on public choice 
theory, and then we operationalized them. Writing up the chapter was preceded by a 
comprehensive and thorough literature review, so we built on the most important domestic 
and international scientific publications dealing with the movement. 
Following the introduction of the movement, we described the theoretical framework and 
methodology by which we wish to find answer to our research questions. Our model, 
consisting of all together four explanatory blocks, relies on the findings of the new 
institutional school of economics, the theoretical framework which was presented by the 
description of the literature. During our analysis, we focused on the first two blocks of our 
model, on informal and on formal institutions, because we can provide answers to our 
research questions based on these as well. 
In order to capture the institutional framework by the appropriate variables, the notion of 
institution was described in details, also covering the relationship between informal and 
formal institutions. In this part the results of the relevant international and domestic 
publications were introduced. When characterizing the informal institutional factors, the 
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notion of culture was defined based on the works of Hofstede and Ingelhart. The dependent 
variable of our model is the likelihood of the successful implementation of the NPM 
movement, so we had to operationalize the success of the NPM reforms. Thus, we developed 
four success indicators: the literature based ten and five item success indicator, the citizens’ 
interest indicator and the politicians’ interest indicator. We developed the citizens’ interest 
indicator and the politicians’ interest indicator based on the logic laid out in the chapter 
describing the objectives of the NPM. The theoretical foundation of these indicators is formed 
by the public choice theory. We described in details all three indicators, and we introduced 
those studies, which also attempted to capture the success of the NPM. During the 
introduction of our model we described Pollitt – Bouckaert’s [2000] model and we also 
referred to other models, which analyzed the workings of the NPM reforms and their social 
embeddedness. 
After this, our hypotheses were tested through the utilization of our model and through the 
application of statistical tools. We developed path analysis models, which are in reality a 
series of linear regression calculations. By the help of these statistical methods we received 
answer to our research questions and we could test our hypotheses. 
The most important yield of the study is that it proved through statistical analyses that 
informal institutions, in other words norms, traditions, habits, beliefs and social culture that 
are followed by the members of society, play a decisive role in deciding whether the reforms 
related to the new public management movement can be successfully introduced in a given 
country or not. If the informal institutions of a country differ from the approach of the NPM 
movement, then the low probability of the successful implementation should prompt 
professional practitioners to fit the reforms to be introduced to the informal institutional 
facilities of the country. The practical relevance of this statement is significant: it can even 
influence the aid policy of the European Union. If the culture or traditions of a new member 
state differ from the cultures of the leading countries of the EU, then the European Union 
takes up a huge risk, if it encourages / forces the new member states to implement such 
reforms that do not fit the informal institutions of the given countries. In recent years the 
European Union has spent significant amounts on the support of the reforms in the new 
member states, a decisive part of which can be linked to the NPM movement. Based on the 
current study we can claim that these reforms will be unsuccessful with high probability, if 
during their implementation they do not sufficiently take into consideration the informal 
institutional environment characteristic of the given country. In most cases the result is 
squandered billions, or the development of non-sustainable systems, or even worse, distorted 
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reforms causing effects contrary to the objectives. At the beginning of our dissertation we 
alluded to some case studies, which analyzed the introduction of the NPM in Africa and Asia 
and they pointed out the seriously negative effects of the reforms belonging to the NPM 
movement. These cases are “trivial” in the sense that in the instances of non-democratic 
systems the toolkit of the NPM movement works in a dysfunctional manner. Based on the 
current study we can claim that even under democratic and market economic conditions the 
success of the NPM reforms cannot be guaranteed. 
We can claim based on the results of the study that the possible introduction of the NPM 
reforms depends decisively on the informal institutions of society and to a smaller extent on 
its formal institutions (the necessary condition of success), while the magnitude of the success 
of the already implemented reforms is determined also by the culture of the public 
administration, and other factors not examined (3. and 4. blocks of our model) in the study 
(sufficient condition). 
We consider the modelling and the description of the differences between the influences of 
formal and informal institutions on the NPM reforms as an important result. During our 
analysis it emerged that the possibility of the implementation of the NPM reforms depends on 
informal institutions, which change slowly and which are givens for politicians and for 
business people at a given point in time. The NPM movement during the past thirty years can 
be characterized as a wave of fashion, which was followed by politicians in order to maximize 
votes. Let us assume that a politician, say that the country’s minister of economy, intuitively 
realizes that the reforms belonging to the NPM movement and demanded by the member of 
society, or by a part of it (for instance the scientific elite), or even by an external organization 
(EU, IMF, etc.) do not fit the country’s culture. In this case, he or she keeps public interests in 
mind, if he or she does not embark on such reform that is doomed to failure with great 
probability, so instead he or she handles the pressure laid on him or her rhetorically. Let us 
not forget that explaining why he or she does not support the implementation of a reform, 
which is successful in another country, is a quite difficult and dangerous political task. 
According to Pollitt, the NPM movement is in a great part the series of such kind of “verbal 
reforms” (Pollitt [2007], p. 14.), which he calls discursive convergence. This could seem as an 
act of compensation, but based on the results of the dissertation it is conceivable that in the 
decisive majority of the cases politicians act correctly, when they do not introduce a given 
NPM reform. Based on our results, the discursive convergence can be interpreted as a 
rational and effective defence mechanism. 
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Our model also points out that those cultural attributes, which are labelled by Inglehart 
[1999] as postmodern, could play a dominant role in the success of the NPM reforms. This is 
by all means thought-provoking, when we decide on whether to recommend or not the 
implementation of the reforms related to the NPM movement in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, where the societies of these countries cannot be characterized by postmodern 
attributes yet. By reviewing the results of the study, we can claim that between the informal 
institutions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the countries successfully 
implementing NPM reforms there exists such a huge gap that most likely these countries 
would not be able to adapt, in other words to tailor the NPM reforms to their own 
institutional environments. The examples that so far have been achieved also attest this, let us 
think of the Slovakian and Czech practices (Nemec, J. –Merickova, B. – Ochrana, F. [2008]), 
(Nemec [2010]), or even the introduction and realization of the Hungarian TÉR system. Based 
on our study, the reasons behind the failures should be found between the differences in the 
approach and value system necessary to the success of the NPM reforms and the informal 
institutional systems of the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Our dissertation pointed out that the role played by formal institutions in the successful 
implementation of the NPM reforms is small. This is proved by that the values of the principle 
components of informal institutions are the highest in the case of the Scandinavian countries, 
yet these countries were able to successfully adapt the reforms of the NPM movement. The 
root of the difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian reforms is worth to be 
analyzed further, since according to our assumption the differences between the informal 
institutions stand behind this as well (think of the description in the case of 1. model version). 
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